



AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION, INT'L  
FRONTIER AIRLINES MEC

# 2023 STRATEGIC PLAN EXECUTIVE SUMMARY



# INTRODUCTION

Since its merger with the Air Line Pilots Association, Int'l in 2016, Frontier Airlines' pilot leadership has studied the environment in which the airline exists, analyzed Frontier's changing operation, bargained a new contract, made substantial efforts to vigorously enforce that agreement, and tried to fashion a constructive labor relationship with Frontier management.

The Frontier Master Executive Council's work over the past eight years has been reviewed carefully. The airline and industry environment going forward has been discussed by the MEC. Our profession's standing and status has evolved rapidly and has been highlighted by robust hiring during the life of our agreement. The previous and current bargaining cycle has substantially enhanced the pay, benefits, and work rules for all pilots and clarified the pilot marketplace.

Most importantly, the Frontier MEC has polled and surveyed our pilot group and had a series of conversations with Frontier pilots about their goals and expectations for negotiations and their careers. Those goals and expectations are not only reflected in polling and surveys, but also in the exit interviews conducted by the FFT MEC as part of the high pilot turnover and attrition at Frontier Airlines.

This is an interim executive summary of the MEC's continuing strategic-planning work. It outlines the MEC's initial observations, goals, and planning considerations to share with Frontier pilots. The MEC's planning and work to accomplish goals will continue to be reported and shared with the pilot group at regular intervals as it progresses.

The FFT MEC understands that Frontier management considers itself an industry "disruptor," and knows that it is driven substantially by achieving the lowest possible costs and has repeated examples and experience with Company efforts to slow and frustrate constructive labor relations. Frontier management plainly does not accept the operational, financial, or competitive value of working closely with pilot representatives.

The above considerations, and the preparation for Section 6 negotiations, underpin the MEC's desire to carefully discuss and implement a strategic plan that governs its work in all areas. In November 2022 the FFT MEC, key committee volunteers, and member and staff representatives met to begin the strategic-planning discussions.

This Executive Summary is organized as follows:

Section 1: Background and Environment

Section 2: MEC Goals

Section 3: Findings and Observations

Section 4: Summary and Conclusion

The following is a list of participants in strategic-planning discussions:

**FFT MEC Officers:**

- Capt. Tracy Smith, MEC Chair
- Capt. Dan Reitzig, MEC Vice Chair
- F/O Shawn Mullin, MEC Secretary-Treasurer

**FFT MEC Members:**

- Capt. Tyler Hover, LEC 163 Chair
- Capt. Greg Calkins, LEC 163 Vice Chair
- F/O Shawn Mullin, LEC 163 Secretary-Treasurer
- Capt. Doug Zink, LEC 165 Chair
- F/O Randi Freyer, LEC 165 Vice Chair
- Capt. Mike Rider, LEC 165 Secretary-Treasurer
- Capt. Tony Chibnik, LEC 167 Chair
- F/O Jonathan Grindol, LEC 167 Vice Chair
- Capt. Dosh Hirao, LEC 167 Secretary-Treasurer
- Capt. Katie Judge, LEC 169 Chair
- F/O Gary Holzinger, LEC 169 Vice Chair
- Capt. Jonathan Greene, LEC 169 Secretary-Treasurer and Hotel Chair

**FFT MEC Committee Members:**

- Capt. Jim Lally, Negotiating Chair
- Capt. Mark Manausa, Negotiating Member
- Capt. Gary Michalk, Negotiating Member
- Capt. Jeff Larson, SPSC Chair
- Capt. Tradd Gralak, Membership Chair
- Capt. Eric Boyko, Grievance Chair
- Capt. Todd Bole, Communications Chair
- Capt. Jeff Hicks, Retirement and Insurance Chair

## **ALPA National Representatives:**

- Capt. Tyler Hawkins, ALPA Vice President–Administration/Secretary
- Capt. Ronan O’Donoghue, Chair, ALPA National SPSC
- Capt. Alan Christie, Committee Member, ALPA National SPSC
- Capt. Jeff Hicks, ALPA Group B2 Executive Vice President
- Bruce York, Chief Negotiator, Representation Department
- Jennifer Bunkers, Labor Relations Counsel, Representation Department
- A.J. Lindell, Labor Relations Counsel, Representation Department
- Rushi Patel, Sr. Economic Analyst, Economic & Financial Analysis Department
- Lydia Jakub, Strategic Planning & Resources Specialist, SMD&R Department
- Rusty Ayers, Strategic Communications Advisor, Communications Department

## SECTION 1: BACKGROUND AND ENVIRONMENT

### A. Carrier History and Profile

The modern Frontier Airlines was created in 1994 by a group of Denver investors after Continental Airlines closed its Denver hub. Initially offering service only to the Great Plains states, the airline expanded through the 1990s and early 2000s and began flying to the East and West coasts as well as some additional Midwest destinations.

#### 2008 Bankruptcy

After signing a service agreement with Republic Airlines in 2007, Frontier declared bankruptcy in April 2008 and was bought by Republic Air Holdings in August 2009. It emerged from bankruptcy in October of that year as a wholly owned Republic subsidiary. Republic also bought Midwest Airlines at about the same time and later merged the Midwest and Frontier brands, with Frontier being the surviving carrier. During this period, The International Brotherhood of Teamsters claimed representation rights, and Frontier pilots were forced to go through a seniority list integration process before the acquisition referenced below provided for separation from Republic and the Teamsters.

#### Acquisition by Indigo Partners

In December 2013, private equity firm Indigo Partners LLC, the former owners of ultra-low-cost carrier (ULCC) Spirit Airlines, purchased Frontier from Republic Air Holdings for \$36 million. Indigo co-founder and Managing Director William Franke was named Frontier's chairman, and in 2015 former Spirit VP of Marketing Barry Biffle assumed the same role at Frontier as VP of Marketing. Indigo immediately began the process of transforming Frontier into a ULCC with the same business model as Spirit.

#### Contract Concessions

Between 2008 and 2011, the pilots voluntarily participated in multiple restructurings of the company by agreeing to wage and other concessions worth almost \$90 million to avoid a second bankruptcy and the potential shutdown of the airline. The largest of these concessionary agreements was LOA 67.

Ratified in 2011, LOA 67 included contract concessions totaling \$53 million. In exchange, the Company agreed it would reinstate a pay increase deferred in 2017, open pay negotiations, and bargain in good faith if Frontier achieved two consecutive years of annual 5 percent pretax profit. The Company also agreed to provide pilots with a 4 percent equity stake in the airline via an entity known as FAPAInvest.

Despite easily exceeding the 5 percent threshold, Frontier management did not negotiate in good faith under the terms of LOA 67. A grievance was filed that went to arbitration. A neutral arbitrator ruled in the pilots' favor and ordered Frontier management to bargain in good faith over pay increases—negotiations that were unsuccessful.

In 2016, the Frontier pilots, who until then had been represented by an independent union called the Frontier Airlines Pilots Association (FAPA), began the process of merging with the Air Line Pilots

Association, Int'l (ALPA). Following road shows and presentations, the merger was approved by over 95 percent of the Frontier pilots, and ALPA was certified as the collective bargaining agent for Frontier pilots on June 1, 2016. Section 6 negotiations were already underway as the pilot CBA had become amendable.

## **IPO**

In late March 2017, Frontier filed an S-1 statement with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission announcing its intent to make an initial public offering (IPO) of stock in the airline. In its S-1, the Company boasted of its numerous competitive strengths, including its superior brand, cost structure, and opportunity for growth. The IPO was expected to take place in 2Q 2017 but was subsequently shelved until April 2021, when a limited amount of stock was sold in a new partial offering.

## **The 2019 Contract**

In December 2018, ALPA and Frontier reached an agreement in principle on a new comprehensive collective bargaining agreement. The MEC approved a tentative agreement (TA) and authorized membership ratification. Frontier pilots ratified the agreement on January 10, 2019, with 77 percent voting in favor of the TA.

The CBA included a five-year duration with a six-month early opener and a \$75 million signing bonus. It provided large pay increases that brought the pilot group within the range of industry-standard wages, continued premium pay for credit hours over 82 in a month, enhanced work rules, improved health insurance coverage and administration, and increased retirement contributions. The Company demanded and achieved adoption of a preferential bidding system.

The current contract provides a strong base for continued improvements, with fewer key issues needing to be addressed compared to the last contract round. Frontier's contract becomes amendable in January 2024. ALPA and Frontier can elect to open Section 6 negotiations in July 2023.

## **COVID**

The Frontier MEC recognized the implications of the COVID-19 pandemic at an early stage and began negotiations with management to reduce the pandemic's impact on furloughs. Ultimately, seven separate COVID letters of agreement were negotiated and adopted that eliminated 600 furloughs and 235 downgrades by placing pilots on various types of leave with monthly pay reduced to 50, 35, or zero hours of credit. The COVID LOAs also provided numerous protections for pilots exposed to or infected by the virus. These protections continue through the negotiated LOA 15.

## **Post-COVID and Attempted Merger**

In general, ULCC and other small leisure carriers weathered the COVID-19 pandemic and travel downturn better than network competitors. Once travel restrictions were lifted, pent-up demand for leisure travel produced higher ridership and revenue than pre-2019 levels in many cases. Negotiation of the COVID LOAs helped regulate pilot staffing and mitigate potential retraining bubbles that would have been caused by furloughs.

In February 2022, Frontier Holdings announced its intent to buy its ULCC competitor Spirit Airlines, a move that could have created the nation’s fifth-largest airline. However, JetBlue made a competing all-cash offer in April that it claimed was a better deal for investors than the Frontier proposal. Both suitors sweetened their offers as Spirit delayed a vote four times lacking shareholder support for the Frontier deal. In late July 2022, Frontier announced it was abandoning the proposed merger and Spirit shareholders voted to merge with JetBlue although the merger still faces regulatory approval.


## Fleet and Operations

Originally an all-Boeing 737 airline, Frontier is now an all-Airbus operator with one of the youngest fleets in the industry. The airline currently flies eight A320CEOs, 82 A320NEOs, 21 A321CEOs, and 13 A321NEOs. It also has orders for 18 A321XLRs, making Frontier the U.S. launch customer for this type. The markets for these future aircraft have not been described, but the XLR will be the longest-range narrowbody aircraft in the world, with the potential for longer stage lengths—raising questions regarding rest, food, staffing, basing, and facilities when they enter service.

Frontier operates more than 450 daily flights to more than 100 destinations in the United States, Canada, Mexico, and the Caribbean. Its schedule and route map are fluid and change often as the airline enters new test markets and abandons those or others.

## B. Economic Overview

While operating as a full-service hub airline, Frontier suffered from poor financial performance and eventually filed for bankruptcy. Following its 2013 acquisition by Indigo Partners, Frontier’s strategic focus changed to becoming a ULCC. It was not until 2015 that its new strategy and cost mindset as an ULCC became clear. Frontier’s transformation as a ULCC involved fast growth away from its Denver hub, higher-capacity aircraft, leisure locations, greater seasonality, and a big focus on overpriced, underserved, and unserved markets. The airline began to prioritize lower costs, higher load factors, higher productivity, more ancillaries from greater traffic volume, and better performance. Between 2015 and 2019, Frontier nearly doubled in size by scheduling 12.7 million additional seats. Post-pandemic, Frontier is averaging 30 million seats per year.



ULCCs continue to be a profitable segment of the airline industry. Passenger traffic is high, with both passengers and fares exceeding pre-2019 levels. Frontier has increased its revenue with ancillary fees and maintained low costs. Assuming the SPA-JBU merger is approved, FFT will become the nation's largest ULCC and will continue to have opportunities for growth.

Frontier sits at the end of the bargaining cycle, with at least Alaska, Delta, JetBlue, Hawaiian, and Spirit having achieved new contracts before Frontier enters Section 6 bargaining and recently achieved tentative agreements at American and FedEx Express. As a publicly traded company, it will be easier for the MEC to see the airline's financials during bargaining.

The Company has a plan for growth and a fleet plan in place to achieve that growth. The airline has moved to create multiple hiring pipelines to ensure a steadier flow of new pilots to staff its expansion plans but, as the ever-increasing bonus/loan program and continued turnover prove, its efforts to staff sufficiently are not fully successful.

### **C. Pilot Group**

As of January 2023, Frontier employed 2,046 pilots. Of these, approximately one-quarter of the group are probationary new hires. For many of the new pilots, Frontier is their first airline job, and they have no experience with unions or a hostile management group. The average age of a Frontier pilot is 44, and the average pilot longevity is 7.5 years. In 2022, Frontier hired 554 pilots; 271 Frontier pilots left the carrier. FFT averaged 42 pilots in each 2022 new-hire class, with an average attrition of 23 pilots per month.


The airline currently has four local ALPA councils covering nine pilot bases: Denver and Dallas (ALPA Council 165); Philadelphia and Atlanta (ALPA Council 167); Orlando, Tampa, and Miami (ALPA Council 169); and Las Vegas and Phoenix (ALPA Council 163).

After long being the largest pilot base, Denver is rapidly being outpaced by Orlando and Las Vegas, particularly as pilots are displaced from the DEN domicile to staff up other, newer domiciles. The Company's inability to establish consistent pilot bases has resulted in a disruption of the pilots' quality of life, including inconsistent schedules and adversely impacting commutability.

A January 2023 geo-plot shows (see next page) the home cities of FFT pilots and indicates that most of the pilot group lives in the eastern half of the United States, despite Frontier's historic roots in the west. Polling data indicate that roughly half of Frontier pilots are commuters.

Frontier pilots have expressed their concerns about lack of scheduled hotel and ground transportation, pay rates that are below industry peers, closing and shrinking bases, frequent schedule changes and trip reassignments, repeated contract violations, excessive discipline, safety concerns, a large percentage of "red-eye" or back-side-of-the-clock flying, the lack of productive three- and four-day trips, the lack of commutable trips and commuter benefits, and the rapid movement to a diversified network plan wherein many smaller domiciles with shorter trips supplant the established bases resulting in a rapid decrease in quality of life for the more than 50 percent of pilots who commute to work at Frontier.





## D. The MEC and Pilot Leadership

The MEC is respected within ALPA, as proven by the election of Frontier pilots to national offices and the group's receipt of national PAC awards. The MEC has ample resources for the upcoming negotiations and good financial discipline.

Key committees are adequately staffed; there is substantial continuity on many committees and within the MEC and staff team and many team members have experience from the previous round of Section 6 negotiations. The MEC is willing to speak openly with each other, even when they disagree. Pilot leadership continues without interruption, even when there is leadership turnover. Additionally, the MEC officers are experienced and respected.

Certain concerns were identified, however. Rather than focusing on strategic goals and sticking to them, the MEC often finds it must commit resources to adequately address member concerns and challenges driven by management's issue of the day.

The Company's decision to create many small domiciles has strained further strained resources, with more pilot bases than Delta (seven) and as many as United (nine).

The growth of the pilot group is not reflected in the growth and size of its committees. While most committees are adequately staffed, we are still searching for motivated volunteers because some members serve on multiple committees.

The MEC has not made full use of social media, nor are some members social media-savvy. To be used successfully, the communication approval process will have to be clarified and efficient rather than unwieldy.

The MEC has historically had the respect and trust of Frontier pilots. But with the substantial turnover and new pilots hired at Frontier, with diverse backgrounds and little ALPA experience or union familiarity, current polling will be used to assess whether credibility, respect, and the effectiveness of communications is at high enough levels.

## **E. Management and Labor Relations**

After a post-2019 TA honeymoon period where the Association and management worked collaboratively to implement PBS successfully, ALPA-management relations have declined. Management decisions often appear arbitrary, poorly thought out, and not consistent with business considerations. One example was the sudden closure of the Chicago domicile while at the same time announcing to the public 10 new destinations to be served by new service from MDW.

In January 2021, during the COVID pandemic and in the height of the omicron surge, the company sent investigatory notices to 44 pilots for their use of contractually afforded sick time. The pilots were required to travel to Denver for Section 19 hearings and were later sent disciplinary decision letters that were placed in their personnel files.

But most notable is the Company's unwillingness and/or inability to solve problems, and its repeated efforts to avoid contract compliance and resolve disputes.

In the spring of 2021, the Company chose to ignore the hotel-selection process in MOU 1 and unilaterally began placing pilots in hotel accommodations in Cancun that were not contractually compliant. Safety and security concerns and a lack of suitable food options caused the hotels to be noncompliant, but saved the Company a lot of money. The Association filed a grievance which was heard before an arbitrator in September 2022 and was decided in the pilots' favor.

In November 2022, the Association presented its expense-reimbursement case, which was also decided in the pilots' favor. The case involved pilots who incurred expenses for securing their own transportation and/or hotel accommodations on layovers, but were not reimbursed in accordance with the CBA. It is not uncommon for the Company to fail to secure ground transportation and/or hotel accommodations, so the contract affords pilots relief to seek self-help in these instances while ensuring timely reimbursement within 30 days. Unfortunately, the Company was not willing to comply with the 30-day timeline, nor was it willing to resolve this outside of arbitration.

Beyond contract enforcement issues, there are longer-term career concerns for Frontier pilots based on the Company's vision, strategy, and conduct, or lack thereof. It's unclear whether Indigo has a long-term commitment to airline operations, or sees them simply as an asset to be monetized, traded, or merged.

Continued operational and customer service breakdowns raise doubts about whether management can execute its expansion plans successfully. Known flaws in the airline's technology have caused past meltdowns and have not been addressed by management with its cost-cutting focus.

There are serious concerns over the Company's inability to compete in the marketplace for experienced pilots due to an ever-widening compensation gap, as well as quality of life and job-satisfaction measures noted elsewhere in this summary. Newly hired pilots increasingly lack experience in airline or large aircraft operations. When combined with the sheer volume of training events occurring due to rapid pilot turnover, it places a heavy burden on the Training/Checking Department as well as the Pilot Standards group. Check pilots are frustrated and resigning. The Chief Pilot's Office is dysfunctional and not respected by the pilot group. The culture in the Safety and Training departments is toxic, as recent experience with 2022 tail-strike issues highlights. The CEO has repeatedly demonstrated that he is willing to act capriciously and vindictively, but also without deliberation or explanation from a corporate perspective. The recent changes to add bases and change schedules to shorter trips as a competitive market response is just one example, but unexpectedly closing the Chicago domicile without advance notice to the Association was another.

Legacy carriers have learned to compete with ULCCs much more successfully than before, and have easily shifted more flying to domestic routes. Having successfully weathered the COVID pandemic, Frontier Airlines is positioned to take advantage of its ULCC approach, but is also challenged by competition. Incessant cost cutting results in the airline being routinely profitable, but also means that infrastructure spending and staffing are scrutinized and minimized. Whether the airline can execute its aggressive growth strategy that would have Frontier more than double in size over the next few years is an open question.

## SECTION 2: MEC GOALS

### **Goal 1: Build a Strong and Supportive Pilot Group to Promote Unity and Achieve Goals**

The MEC's goals require a strong, supportive, organized, and unified pilot group to complete. Historic and current examples demonstrate that pilot group unity and support typically require (a) trust and confidence in the pilot leadership team (MEC and committees), (b) a plan that pilots understand and fully support, (c) regular and effective two-way communication, (d) successful execution of the plan.

Success will be strengthened by a comprehensive understanding of the MEC's activities and concerns, the Company's conduct, industry developments/risks, and full pilot group participation and engagement—elements that will be supported by the Strategic Preparedness and Strike Committee (SPSC).

### **Goal 2: Strengthen MEC Communications Programs to Engage Pilots, and Establish the MEC as the Primary Information Resource for Frontier Pilots**

Full and transparent information to the pilot group, and continuous input and feedback from line pilots, is the bedrock for the FFT MEC's plan and work. Timely and effective execution of the plan, and continued explanation of the MEC's goals and work, will build confidence in the plan and leadership.

In addition to building support for the MEC's plan, Frontier pilots must understand that Frontier management is unjustifiably proud of eliminating administrative "overhead." Information about operations, the Company's own plans or direction, employee benefits, and many other subjects that are available to pilots at other airlines, aren't provided by Frontier management or easily available. The MEC has already started to fill this vacuum for Frontier pilots and is committed to being a useful and credible information resource for Frontier pilots during employment at the Company and as they evaluate a career path.

### **Goal 3: Obtain Compliance with CBA and Efficiently Resolve Legitimate Disputes**

Compliance with the CBA and respect for its resolution processes is required to avoid undermining the contract, wasting time in the collective bargaining process, and breeding lack of confidence in ALPA representation more generally.

The CBA must be enforced efficiently and vigorously, and contract disputes must be quickly resolved. The MEC's work in the last contract negotiation to boost contract enforcement was positive, but not enough given management's disregard for agreement provisions, frequent contract violations, and often arbitrary discipline of pilots. More resources are essential in this area and continued attention to it in negotiations is critical.

### **Goal 4: Negotiate Improved Market-Based CBA in Contract Cornerstone Areas**

The negotiating environment for pilots is strong, with continued airline profitability, abundant career opportunities for pilots, and clear contract patterns being established at other carriers. Polling and

surveys of Frontier pilots demonstrate overwhelming support for cornerstone contract provisions.

Efficient negotiation of an improved, market-rate contract during a positive bargaining environment avoids falling substantially behind the pay and benefit contract patterns for our profession established in other pilot collective bargaining agreements in the current negotiating cycle.

### **Goal 5: Change Corporate Culture to Provide More Constructive Labor Relationship**

Meeting participants voiced a lack of confidence in the Company's direction and strategy and expressed widespread frustration with, and negative views of, FFT management in areas that include working together generally, negotiations, contract compliance, dispute resolution, safety, training, discipline, and others.

There is widespread agreement that senior management does not respect employees or their representatives, does not act in good faith with the goal of constructive relations, and does not understand or value the financial, operational, or competitive advantage of positive engagement or relationships with its employees.

The FFT MEC will continue to demand changes to the way that management conducts labor relations and will promote collaborative work. If necessary, and because the FFT MEC believes firmly that both Frontier pilots and the Company will be advantaged by collaborative work, the FFT MEC will seek assistance from analysts, investors, government representatives, customers, and the public.

Whether a constructive relationship with current management is possible is still an open question. Furthermore, if a rewarding career with Frontier will result with the current management in place still needs more attention from individual pilots.

### **Goal 6: Substantially Improve the Safety Culture at Frontier**

The MEC requires the highest level of safety. It is committed to working toward continuous improvements, and has expressed its concerns about deficiencies in the Company's safety culture. Currently, Frontier's safety culture lacks a history of trust that is customary and consistent with industry standards. While Company leadership has committed in writing to the highest safety standards and to continuous improvement in safety and safety culture, managers in general view safety as metrics, targets, audits, and assessments, so a disconnect exists between management and frontline workers. Frontline workers view safety through the reality of work, pressures on the system resulting in breakdowns in the system. Managers view safety through the data that reaches them, while frontline workers view safety through a lens of pressures that are experienced on the job. If the frontline then mitigates these pressures, but does not report them appropriately, the manager never sees them.

If we as frontline workers desire for the safety culture to improve at Frontier airlines, we must maintain the highest level of safety ourselves while reporting our safety concerns collectively in the data language that managers understand. Under the FAA's current Safety Management System (SMS)/ Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP) structure, management predicts hazards to safety from the data that they are given, but it is the frontline workers who primarily have the capacity to identify real hazards and are therefore the foundation to the SMS.

## **Goal 7: Prepare for and Resource the MEC for Further Industry Consolidation, Mergers, and Transactions**

The failed Spirit merger effort highlights continuing industry consolidation. The MEC is fully committed to having the financial and professional resources available to participate in and influence any possible transaction.

Institutional investors typically hold large proportions of airline stock. The interests of corporate owners and insiders may diverge from the interests of Frontier pilots. The MEC is utilizing experienced outside legal counsel to work with the Negotiating Committee and to advise it on Section 1 proposals and bargaining. Merger counsel has been retained to handle seniority integration and related matters.

## SECTION 3: FINDINGS AND OBSERVATIONS

- The MEC's repeated efforts to engage with management constructively and ALPA polling and surveys all highlight the lack of positive feelings by Frontier pilots related to their experience at the airline.
- Frequent changes to the airline's route system, basing, and strategy underpin a widespread lack of confidence in senior management's long-term vision and plan. Difficulty reaching middle managers and frequent operational hiccups undermines confidence in their ability to manage airline operations and hotel, training, and safety issues, among other things.
- The labor-relations process at Frontier is broken. Pilots don't believe the Company has any interest, or sees any value, in a collaborative and constructive relationship. The airline's competitive position in relation to companies that understand and value cooperation will continue to erode. Pilots will continue to leave Frontier for companies who demonstrate more respect for their employees.
- Frontier pilots express frequent and widespread concerns with training, high pilot turnover, and safety programs generally.
- Frontier pilots are frustrated by the credibility gap between what is presented by their management in terms of support, trustworthiness, and accountability, versus the reality of a lack of contract compliance, uneven application of disciplinary measures, and operational support actually experienced on the line.

## SECTION 4: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

FFT MEC pilot leaders have regularly tried to engage Company senior managers and leaders to explain and substantiate these observations and concerns, among others, and establish a more constructive labor relationship. Senior managers make no effort to communicate with line employees. The competitive industry environment, and challenges that flow from aircraft and engine delays, should cause senior management to reexamine the value of greater cooperation.

Frontier pilots are willing to be key and constructive partners if the relationship with management is respectful, constructive, honest, and reciprocal. If not, and the current relationship continues, the FFT MEC has a plan with the financial and professional resources to represent Frontier pilots fully and achieve its stated goals.